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Tensions and occasional overt defiance of international courts sug-
gest that compliance with international regimes is not a self-evident
choice for domestic judges. I develop a formal theory of domestic
judicial defiance in which domestic and supranational judges vie for
jurisprudential authority in a non-hierarchical setting. The model em-
phasises the role of domestic non-compliance costs and power asymme-
tries in determining the conduct of domestic and international judges.
I argue that the EU represents a special case of a particularly effec-
tive international regime. Weak domestic courts have little to gain
from an escalated conflict with the European Court of Justice. But
even domestic judicial superpowers like the German Federal Consti-
tutional Court have strong incentives to seek mutual accommodation
with European judges. The analysis also yields new insights into con-
cepts, such as “judicial dialogue” and “constitutional pluralism” that
have featured prominently in the legal literature, and suggests new
hypotheses for empirical research.
JEL Keywords: K40, C72, C73.
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1 Introduction
Compliance with international legal regimes commonly involves the judicial
branch as well as the legislative and executive arms of the state. But just as
other public officials, domestic judges may be tempted to resist the authority
of international law. The problem is, to some degree, familiar to every multi-
level governance structure. Even in a highly integrated federal polity such
as the United States, state courts have sometimes overtly defied injunctions
issued by the US Supreme Court (Sharkey, 2009). Yet this compliance prob-
lem appears to be magnified manifold when we turn to international regimes
such as the EU or the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights, where
no clear hierarchy exists between international and domestic tribunals. Un-
like the US Supreme Court,1 international courts, including the European
Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights, lack the power
to reverse the determinations of domestic courts.
For students of international regimes this fact suggests a number of puz-
zles. First, to a much larger degree than federal law in a federal system, the
effectiveness of international law appears to hinge on the willingness of na-
tional judges to cooperate with their international counterparts. Yet the fear
that international adjudicators might become rival lawmakers may induce
domestic courts to resist cooperation. Instances of overt judicial defiance
can be observed across a wide range of international regimes. The Supreme
Court of Venezuela, for example, has refused to comply with orders issued by
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and has called on the Venezue-
lan government to withdraw from the Inter-American Convention on Human
Rights.2 Similarly, in a noted 2008 decision, the US Supreme Court refused to
enforce the International Court of Justice Avena judgement. Another illus-
tration is the 2012 ruling of the Czech Constitutional Court which expressly
pronounced the ECJ preliminary ruling in Landtova´ a ultra vires act (Bobek,
2014). What do these rulings tell us about the strength of these regimes?
Do they constitute mere accidents bound, as such, to remain rare or are
they symptomatic of a broader compliance problem? On the other hand, the
1The US Supreme Court was explicitly granted the authority to reverse state court
decisions by Section 25 of the 1789 Judiciary Act. A prerogative the Court first put
to use against Virginian courts in Fairfax’s Devisee v. Hunter’s Lessee, 11 U.S. 603
(1813)(Story,J.).
2Tribunal Supremo de Justicia, Decision No. 1939 of 18 Dec. 2008, Gustavo A´lvarez et
al..
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absence of hierarchy between international and domestic courts may open
the possibility for domestic judges to negotiate the terms of the compliance
partnership. One way for domestic judges to back their bargaining position
is to issue non-compliance threats. In the EU such threats have become in-
creasingly frequent over the years. On several occasions, the German Federal
Constitutional Court (GFCC) has warned the ECJ that EU acts found to go
beyond the EU’s remit would be ruled unconstitutional (Stein, 2011, Alter,
2001). The German ultra vires doctrine was then embraced by several courts
in other EU member countries and inspired the 2012 Czech constitutional
ruling (Sadurski, 2008, Bobek, 2014). How effective are such threats? How
do disparities in institutional stature bear on the ability of domestic courts
to extract concessions from international judges? A further puzzle arises
from the situation where neither overt defiance nor non-compliance threats
are observed. Can it be attributed to the effectiveness of the international
regime? Or does it result, on the contrary, from international judges exercis-
ing restraint out of fear that national courts might disbobey their rulings?
The present paper seeks to elucidate these puzzles by developing a formal
model of inter-court interaction in non-hierarchical settings. The model has
an international court and a domestic high court competing over jurisdic-
tional resources. The two courts, however, incur institutional costs when a
jurisdictional dispute escalate into an all-out constitutional crisis. For inter-
national judges, these crisis costs represent the loss of authority that directly
results from domestic non-compliance. For domestic judges, they represent
the institutional price of defiance when refusal to comply with international
rules triggers an adverse domestic reaction, as legislators proceed to punish
the rebellious court for undermining their country’s commitment to the in-
ternational regime. The baseline model shows that variations in crisis costs
lead to distinct outcomes which reflect the depth and effectiveness of the
corresponding international regime. Other things being equal, higher cri-
sis costs for domestic judges are associated with greater effectiveness. Even
within effective international regimes, though, the fate of domestic judges
may vary significantly. Power asymmetry entails that weak domestic courts
have much to lose and little to win from an escalated conflict with a powerful
international court. Domestic judicial superpowers, meanwhile, are in better
position to contain activist international judges, although power symmetry
means they have strong incentives to seek mutual accommodation and to
avoid escalation. I then consider extensions to the baseline model that help
bring the use of non-compliance threats by domestic high courts in strong
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international regimes into sharper focus. Non-compliance threats are mod-
elled as cheap talk, which domestic judges can use to communicate their
preferences over the jurisdictional issue at stake. I demonstrate that, under
certain conditions, the non-compliance threats issued by a powerful domes-
tic court can function as an effective signalling device as part of a peaceful
issue-trading equilibrium. Without being actually carried to execution, such
threats can be viewed as an effective instrument of judicial dialogue. I dis-
cuss ECJ-GFCC relations in the EU in light of this finding. I also discuss
the situation of high courts in other member states that have imported the
GFCC’s ultra vires doctrine into their own jurisprudence and issued similar
non-compliance threats. I argue that because these courts lack the GFCC’s
deterrence capability they are unable to extract large jurisdictional conces-
sions from the ECJ. For the same reason, even in the rare occasions where
these weaker judicial actors have followed through on their threats this be-
haviour may be more accurately interpreted as an accidental departure from
an ECJ supremacy equilibrium than as evidence of a systemic compliance
problem. This result highlights the limits of doctrinal borrowing when courts
seek to emulate the jurisprudential strategies of judicial bodies operating in
more favourable institutional environments.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the literature
on domestic judicial compliance. Section 3 presents the baseline model, dis-
cussing its key assumptions, equilibria and comparative statics. When both
courts prefer a jurisdictional loss over a constitutional crisis, I show that the
interaction follows the logic of a Hawk-Dove game. I relate this game form
and the corresponding equilibrium solutions to the discussion over “consti-
tutional pluralism” in the EU law literature. Situations of power asymmetry
are shown to result in a supremacy equilibrium either of international law
or of domestic law, depending on which court has the upper hand. When
both courts prefer a constitutional crisis over a jurisdictional loss, on the
other hand, a contentious equilibrium result in which the two courts disre-
gard each other’s pronouncements. Section 4 refines this essentially static
analysis by making interactions between the two courts more dynamic. I
introduce several extensions to the baseline model. These include repetition,
imperfect information and communication. Section 5 uses this revised model
to derive an issue-trading equilibrium in which domestic and supranational
judges accommodate each other on the basis of the importance they attach
to the issue at hand. In this “pacific coexistence” equilibrium, domestic ju-
dicial signalling serves to disclose the domestic court’s preferences, which in
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turn enables the two courts to coordinate their moves. I use this equilib-
rium to explain how ECJ-GFCC relations have evolved over time. Section 6
then considers the situation of weaker domestic courts in deep international
regimes and the limits of doctrinal borrowing. I conclude by considering
some implications of the analysis for future research on domestic judicial
compliance.
2 Legal and Social Science Research on Do-
mestic Judicial Compliance
Scholars from various disciplines and theoretical traditions have stressed em-
bededness, the penetration of domestic legal orders, inter-judicial dialogue
and compliance partnerships between domestic and international judges as a
key determinant of state compliance with international law (Keohane et al.,
2000, Downs et al., 1996, Huneeus, 2011). Domestic courts are viewed as
essential not only to first-order compliance with treaty obligations but also
to second-order compliance with the decisions of supranational judicial bod-
ies. Despite a surge of interest in international dispute resolution and in-
ternational tribunals in recent years, however, research on the dynamics of
domestic judicial compliance is still in its infancy (Huneeus, 2013).
Within political science, students of law and courts have tended to em-
phasise the cooperative aspects of the interplay between international and
domestic judicial power. An important line of inquiry has focused on the
willingness of national courts in the EU to submit references to the ECJ via
the preliminary ruling mechanism (Stone Sweet and Brunell, 1998, Carrubba
and Murrah, 2005, Golub, 1996). A notable exception to the general focus
on preliminary references in this literature is Alter (2001). Looking at France
and Germany, her analysis carefully charts patterns of juridical resistance as
well as cooperation in the gradual–albeit far from linear–process that even-
tually established EU law as supreme. Her institutionalist narrative of legal
integration suggests that, in the EU legal order, legal doctrines represent the
currency of inter-judicial negotiation. Alter has also argued that domestic
apex courts are more likely to resist integration as it threatens to disrupt
their authority over the lower echelon of the court system (Alter, 1998). In
subsequent work, she has set out to explain why international judicial bodies
designed along similar lines have failed to establish the close rapport with
5
domestic courts achieved by the ECJ (Alter and Helfer, 2010, Alter, 2012).
Even so, this research does not identify the bargaining strategies deployed by
the interacting judicial actors. Nor does it specify the conditions under which
non-compliance threats may achieve to contain the expansionist impulses of
an otherwise powerful international court without calling into question the
regime’s very existence in the process.
Unlike political scientists, legal scholars have grappled in equal measure
with the cooperative and the conflictual dimension of the reception of in-
ternational law by domestic courts. Law scholars see wide disparities in the
attitude of domestic judges towards international rules and norms (Nollka-
emper, 2013). Echoing Karen Alter’s court competition hypothesis, they
have also pointed to the reluctance of certain constitutional courts to em-
brace cooperation with international tribunals (Huneeus, 2011, Kumm, 2006,
Dyevre, 2013). Furthermore, EU law scholars acknowledge the strategic na-
ture of inter-court interactions in the EU legal order (Weiler and Haltern,
1996). This is especially apparent in the two narratives that have come to
dominate the EU law literature, namely “judicial dialogue” and “constitu-
tional pluralism”. Devised to capture the complex interplay between the
European Court and its domestic judicial interlocutors, these two narratives
stress “mutual recognition”, “interaction” and “negotiation” as central to ju-
dicial decision making in a non-hierarchical legal system (McCormick, 1999,
Poiares Maduro, 2003, 117-8). Scholars of European law claim to place these
notions at the centre of their picture of law. Yet, because legal scholars,
particularly on the Continent, tend to approach these issues through the ex-
clusive lens of doctrinal analysis, the paradox is that they have relatively
little to say about them.
That the stakes are large for the actors involved along with the fact that
they typically interact in repeated fashion makes strategic, utility-maximizing
behaviour more likely3, suggesting that the question is one eminently suited
for formal modelling. Yet no existing model of judicial politics really ad-
dresses the situation of courts in non-hierarchical settings. To be sure, inter-
judicial relations form the focus of a rapidly expanding body of research
(Westerland et al., 2010, Cameron et al., 2000, Lax, 2003, Kastellec, 2007).
Yet the researchers who developed these formal models did so with the US
3Experiments show that play is more likely to converge towards strategic Nash-
prescribed equilibrium when players have already taken the game several times (Nagel,
1995)
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judiciary in mind. Accordingly, their models presume that the interacting
courts stand in a hierarchical relationship to one another. Judicial compli-
ance is thus essentially approached as a principal-agent problem, as higher
court judges seek to maximise lower court compliance through optimal use
of their limited monitoring capacities. These models, however, do not ade-
quately capture the very distinct bargaining conditions under which courts
operating in non-hierarchical settings operate.
A careful perusal of the literature reveals that formal modellers have not
entirely ignored international legal regimes and we can point to Carrubba
(2005) and Garrett et al. (1998) as valuable attempts to model EU judicial
politics. The assumptions of these two models, though, are at odd with the
emerging interdisciplinary consensus on the bases of domestic compliance.
Indeed, premised on an inter-governmentalist approach to European integra-
tion, they assume that member state governments are the sole interlocutors
and source of external constraints for the ECJ. In other words, they appear
to overlook the relationship the European Court has developed with domes-
tic judges, which various strands of literature have identified as crucial to the
legal integration process.
3 Judicial Conflict in a Non-Hierarchical Set-
ting: Jurisdictional Interests and Non-Compliance
Costs
The baseline model set out in the present section is consistent with recent
judicial behaviour research on both international and domestic courts (Ep-
stein et al., 2013, Pollack, 2013). The model assumes that domestic courts
represent a key determinant of the depth and authority of international legal
regimes (Keohane et al., 2000, Huneeus, 2011). I also assume that inter-court
dynamics are influenced by the position of domestic governmental actors, in-
cluding legislators (Dyevre, 2010). Rather than with the domestic judiciary
as a whole, my analysis is primarily concerned with the behaviour of high
court judges. There are two reasons for this focus on high courts. The
first is institutional. High courts make decisions that are more impactful, as
they typically enunciate the doctrines that are meant to guide the conduct
of lower domestic courts. The other is that lower court judges face a dis-
tinct set of incentives and constraints when it comes to the application of
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international norms (Alter, 1998, Huneeus, 2011). These differences call for
a distinct modelling approach. For related reasons, I focus on overt, rather
than covert, domestic judicial defiance. Judicial deviations from international
rules may take subtle forms such as distinguishing. Domestic courts may also
knowingly deviate from an international norm without even mentioning the
existence of the latter in their rulings. Yet covert non-compliance cannot,
by definition, convey a clear message to the courts’ domestic and interna-
tional audiences. So, unlike overt defiance, covert defiance is unlikely to have
systemic consequences.4
3.1 Baseline Game
Disputes between international and domestic high courts present three salient
characteristics. First, such disputes are fundamentally about jurisdiction.
Here I employ “jurisdiction” in the capacious sense of “authority”, “power”
or “influence” rather than in the narrow, technical sense of “formal right to
review a case”. Tensions between domestic and international courts arise
because of disagreement over who should decide–whether it is about stan-
dards of human rights protection, labour regulations, trade or the limits of
the powers delegated to international law-makers. Generally speaking, given
that one court’s jurisdictional gain is the other’s loss, judges on the opposite
ends of a jurisdictional dispute have antagonistic institutional interests. The
courts involved are thus bound to view jurisdiction as a rivalry good. To be
sure, domestic and international judges may sometimes see eye to eye. A
weak domestic court may embrace international law as a strategy to bolster
its legitimacy at home. Compliance partnerships between international and
domestic courts may thus be mutually beneficial as judicial actors seek to
expand their overall influence against the executive and legislative branch.
The point, though, is that such circumstances are unlikely to give rise to a
jurisdictional dispute.5 Second, inter-court disputes are about institutional
4Since covert non-compliance is less costly for the international regime and, for the
same reason, less likely to trigger court curbing at domestic level, we might speculate that
it is more prevalent in advanced regimes. However, I leave it to future research to identify
when domestic judges will opt for covert rather than overt defiance.
5A more comprehensive model of national-international court interaction would also
consider the conditions under which judges sharing the same agenda will want to cooperate.
This question, however, lies outside the scope of the present paper, which focuses on
judicial defiance–that is, on situations where domestic and international judges pursue
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standing. Because international judges lack the power to overturn the deci-
sions of national courts, an overt dispute between national and international
courts automatically turn into one about the authority of the international
regime and that of its court. Even in the EU, a high court disagreeing
with the ECJ retains the formal power to refuse compliance.6 Institutional
standing matters for international courts because a domestic ruling overtly
defying their commands makes disobedience more likely in the future. Fi-
nally, disputes pitting international courts against domestic judges are about
commitment. A domestic court refusing to comply with the pronouncements
of an international tribunal tests its country’s commitment to the interna-
tional regime in question. If the executive and legislative branches–or the
public at large–are strongly committed to the regime, the defiant court risk
being viewed as harming the country’s interests and international reputation.
This, in turn, may expose it to institutional reprisals in the form of legisla-
tive override, jurisdiction-stripping, etc. Conversely, when this commitment
is weak, domestic judges may defy the authority of international law without
fear of legislative pushbacks.
Represented in Figure 1 is the payoff matrix of a simple game that at-
tempts to capture these factors. The two players, the International Court
and the Domestic Court, compete over a jurisdictional resource and the two
courts must decide whether to be assertive or to exert restraint. If both
courts exert restraint, they end up sharing the jurisdictional resource. If
one court is assertive and the other acquiesces (by exerting restraint), the
assertive court accrues the full value of the jurisdictional resource, while the
acquiescing court incurs a loss. Finally, when both courts play assertive, a
constitutional crisis ensues. As a result, the two courts must not only share
the jurisdictional resource at issue, but also bear the costs arising from the
crisis.
Figure 1 about here
As for the judges’ utility function, J and α in Figure 1 denote the value
attached to the jurisdictional resource by, respectively, the Domestic Court
and the International Court (J > 0 and α > 0). β represents the institu-
tional cost suffered by the International Court in the event of a constitutional
antagonistic interests.
6Surely, some international legal regimes, such as the EU and the Andean Community,
allow international judges to intervene directly in domestic disputes via interlocutory pro-
cedures. Yet such procedures, like the preliminary ruling mechanism in the EU, can only
be activated at the behest of domestic judges.
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crisis (β > 0). Its magnitude reflects the institutional damage that domestic
judicial defiance inflicts on the authority of international judges. Meanwhile,
C captures the institutional cost incurred by the Domestic Court when the
dispute results in a constitutional crisis (C ≥ 0). C can be interpreted as re-
flecting the commitment of governmental actors to the international regime
and their willingness to punish judges who renege on that commitment.7
C = 0 can be interpreted as the absence of commitment to the international
regime or as the incapacity of governmental actors to curb the defiant court,
owing e.g. to high political fragmentation or to strong public support for the
judicial branch. Alternatively, it can be interpreted as unwillingness to em-
bed the international regime. Reflecting a dualist stance on the relationship
between domestic and international law, legislators and other governmental
actors are satisfied to keep it a strictly inter-state agreement. By contrast,
C > 0 indicates that the governing coalition has some commitment to the
international agreement, at both domestic and international level, and that
they are effectively in position to curb judicial defiance.8 While explaining
judicial behaviour in general may arguably require a more elaborate utility
function (see Epstein et al., 2013, 48), this simple model seems to adequately
capture the decisive factor on which jurisdictional disputes habitually turn–
namely the value judges attach to power and prestige.
Various equilibria can be derived from this game using dominance, best
response and Nash solutions. These equilibria reflect the value of the argu-
ments in the judges’ utility function–i.e. how judges weigh institutional costs
and benefits–and the way in which they anticipate each other’s behaviour.
Displayed in Tabled 1 are the four main outcomes generated by the model as
a function of its parameter values. As their names suggest, these four out-
comes correspond to international regimes enjoying disparate levels of depth
7A large C value may also reflect a low degree of judicial independence. This captures
the basic notion that courts lacking institutional autonomy have incentives to kowtow to
the preferences of the other branches.
8Possible extensions to this basic model would consider the possibility for judicial agen-
das to converge (with the possibility that J < 0) along with the possibility for legislators to
punish the Domestic Court for upholding, rather than for flouting, international law. (In
many countries, legislative opposition to international law rather than judicial resistance
may be the principal obstacle to the domestic application of international legal rules.)
Also, whereas I presume the legislative reaction to be exogenous to the courts’ behaviour,
there may be scenarios where conceptualising legislative behaviour as endogenous to ju-




























Table 1: Comparative Statics, Baseline Model.
and integration. I consider each outcome in turn.
3.2 International Law Ineffectiveness Equilibrium
An international legal regime is at its weakest when international judges pre-
fer acquiescence over a constitutional crisis but domestic judges, due to low
crisis cost and strong jurisdictional interest, prefer an escalated conflict over a
jurisdictional loss. This asymmetry yields an equilibrium in which assertive-
ness is a dominant strategy for the Domestic Court while the International
Court’s best response is to acquiesce.9 Low commitment across constituent
9Because best response, unlike dominance, presupposes complete information as well
as common knowledge of rationality, it is also behaviourally less robust (see Costa-Gomes
et al., 2001). Empirically speaking, we are thus more likely to observe unilateral depar-
tures from the equilibrium outcome in the case of international judges. As the fate of the
Southern African Development Community (SADC) Tribunal illustrates, though, a weak
international court that misjudges the preferences of domestic courts does so at its own
peril. In the first salient case it was given to review, the SADC Tribunal ruled that Zim-
babwe’s farm eviction amendment amounted to de facto discrimination of white farmers.
Yet not only did the High Court of Zimbabwe refuse to enforce the judgement but member
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member states means that many existing international regimes, including the
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Organisation
for the Harmonisation of Business Law in Africa (OHADA) and the Andean
Community, may fit this configuration (Alter and Helfer, 2010, Alter, 2012).
Ineffectiveness also appears to characterize the context in which the ECJ
found itself in its early years (Alter, 2012, 151).
Paradoxically, weak regimes are likely to see few overt jurisdictional dis-
putes as international adjudicators, anticipating non-compliance, restrictively
interpret the provisions enshrined in the international agreement (Alter and
Helfer, 2010). Even in its landmark Costa v. ENEL ruling, the ECJ was care-
ful to avoid a clash with the Italian Constitutional Court and held that EU
law was not directly applicable to the Italian legislation at hand (Alter, 2001,
19). Frequently, though, weakness means that international agreements and
the rulings of international tribunals will barely register with domestic judi-
cial actors (Nollkaemper, 2013). In such circumstances, the rarity of defiance
masks, in reality, the regime’s shallow depth (Downs et al., 1996).
This analysis implies that what appears to be relatively widespread coop-
eration with domestic courts may lead scholars to exaggerate the strength of
an international regime. Especially when domestic courts were initially weak,
the prospect of acquiring new powers at the expense of governmental actors
may induce them to cooperate with international adjudicators. Yet interest
alignment can only sustain cooperation up to the point where it ceases to be
advantageous for domestic judges. Thus, even in regimes where domestic and
international judges share the same interests across a broad range of issues,
compliance risks breaking down as soon as conflicts arise.
3.3 Contentious Equilibrium
When both courts prefer a constitutional crisis over a jurisdictional loss, this
results in a contentious equilibrium, in which assertiveness is the dominant
strategy for both judicial actors.10 This equilibrium may reflect national
disparities in regime commitment. An international legal regime may thus
enjoy sufficient support across a sufficient number of constituent member
states to withstand non-compliance in a single state.11 Given the Chavez-
state governments subsequently proceeded to disband the Tribunal.
10As long as 3J > C > 0, the game is a Prisoner’s Dilemma.
11Defiance in one member state, though, may have a domino-effect in other member
countries as each defection makes commitment to the regime less valuable until the tip-
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led government’s low support for the Inter-American Convention on Human
Rights, the Supreme Court of Venezuela could safely ignore the order issued
by the Inter-American Court. Yet the latter enjoyed sufficient support in
other member countries so that defiance by Venezuelan courts did not pose
a systemic threat to its authority. Similarly, in Medell´ın v. Texas the US
Supreme Court was unlikely to face any pressure from Congress to comply
with the International Court of Justice ruling. But, because support for its
existence is spread across many member countries, the ICJ was nonetheless
able to survive US defiance almost intact.
In some cases, reciprocal disregard may reflect the purely inter-state na-
ture of the international legal regime. States are willing to meet the require-
ments of an adverse international rulings but only to the extent that it does
not affect the operations of the domestic legal order. Thus states may agree
to pay a compensation to the aggrieved party but not to force their judges
to apply international law. The upshot is a dualist conception of the re-
lationship between international and domestic law, which does not threaten
the existence of international judges but prevents their policy determinations
from penetrating domestic law. To deny the regime direct effect, domestic
judges typically invoke non-self-executing treaty doctrines, which tend to be
relatively indeterminate and, as such, susceptible to strategic manipulation
(Nollkaemper, 2014).12 A prime example of legal dualism along these lines
is provided by the treatment of World Trade Organisation law in the US
legal system. WTO panels and the Appellate Body have issued numerous
rulings against the United States. Yet both Congress and US courts have
consistently refused to give direct effect to WTO rules (Grimmett, 2011).
Still other regimes may have transited through this equilibrium until ris-
ing non-compliance costs worked to make resistance unaffordable for domes-
tic judges. This may approximate the situation in which the EU found itself
between the early 1970s and the early 1980s. At this intermediate stage
of integration, the ECJ had managed to enlist the support of some domes-
tic judges and several landmark rulings that had direct bearing on national
economic policy-making came down during this period. Yet supremacy and
direct effect were still a contested component of EU membership. French
ping point where the regime begins to collapse. I leave it to future work to explore how
interactions among courts in different member states may affect compliance dynamics.
12These doctrines illustrate the general assumption underlying the present analysis that
legal reasoning rarely constitutes a real constraint on judicial decision making in cases
pertaining to the relationship between international and domestic law.
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legislators, in particular, opposed the notion that EU law ought to have pri-
ority over domestic legislation. So when the French supreme administrative
court, the Conseil d’Etat, overtly defied the authority of the Luxembourg
judges with its 1978 Cohn-Bendit ruling,13, it was unlikely to face legislative
reprisals (Alter, 2001).
3.4 Weak Domestic Courts, Strong International Judges:
International Law Supremacy Equilibrium
The Domestic Court is weakest and the International Court strongest when
domestic judges prefer acquiescence over a constitutional crisis but inter-
national judges prefer a constitutional crisis over a jurisdictional loss. In
this configuration, assertiveness is a dominant strategy for the International
Court while restraint is the Domestic Court’s best response. Such parameter
values appear to approximate the relations between the ECJ and most do-
mestic high courts in the EU as it exists today. Despite the rise of Euroscep-
ticism and Eurosceptic protest parties, virtually all government parties in the
member states remain officially committed to EU membership (Szczerbiak
and Taggart, 2008, Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2008). Moreover, supremacy and
direct effect are now viewed as an integral part of EU membership.
By signalling greater political commitment to EU law, the relaunch of
the European project under Franco-German leadership in the 1980s created
the conditions for further integration of the EU legal order. By raising the
domestic cost of defiance, the shift allowed the ECJ to become an expansion-
ist supranational lawmaker without triggering widespread judicial rebellion
in the member states. A clear sign that the tide had turned in favour of the
European Court was the new attitude of the French Conseil d’Etat which
reversed its long-standing opposition to EU law supremacy in 1989 (Alter,
2001).
These conditions have helped turn the EU into what is arguably the most
effective international legal regime. They also suggest that the only instance
of overt non-compliance of the last three decades, the aforementioned decision
of the Czech Constitutional Court, is best viewed as one-off, accidental depar-
ture from the long-term equilibrium outcome. The Czech decision appears to
have been mainly driven by domestic judicial politics–a long-standing spat
between the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Administrative Court
1322 December 1978, Ministre de l’inte´rieur v. Cohn-Bendit, Rec. 524.
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over pension rights (Bobek, 2014). But the Czech constitutional judges may
also have misjudged the domestic environment, hoping their decision would
rally legislative and presidential support. At any rate, the upshot was that
the Czech Constitutional Court was left diminished and isolated, while the
ECJ’s authority emerged largely unscathed from the episode (Bobek, 2014).
3.5 Judicial Superpowers: Inter-Court Disputes as Hawk-
Dove Game
When the parameter values are such that both courts prefer acquiescence
over a constitutional crisis, the jurisdictional dispute exhibits the structure
of a Hawk-Dove Game.14 The Hawk-Dove set-up provides a good first ap-
proximation of patterns of interaction between the ECJ and the GFCC in
the EU. Of all member state courts, the GFCC is the one with the strongest
credentials to judicial superpower status. Not only is Germany a founding
Member State and Europe’s largest economy. But the GFCC also enjoys
unrivalled institutional standing at home. Thanks to wide access rules and
far-reaching docket control, it has a much tighter grip over its agenda than
any other constitutional court in the EU. For all these reasons and because its
jurisprudential pronouncements attract more media coverage both at home
and abroad, the GFCC has greater capacity to inflict damage on the ECJ.
A ultra vires ruling by the German Court would be more likely to trigger a
domino-effect than the same decision by any other Member State court. At
the same time, though, such a ruling would not only greatly endanger the
authority of EU law but would also undercut the credibility of Germany’s
commitment to integration. This, in turn, would expose the GFCC to a
legislative backlash back home.
This Hawk-Dove approximation points to the strategic tension that lies
at the heart of the EU legal order. Players in a one-shot Hawk-Dove Game
have no dominant strategy. Instead, the game has two pure strategy Nash
equilibria. This stems from the fact that one court’s best response to the
other court’s assertiveness is to exert restraint, but its best response to a re-
strainist court is to be assertive. Evidently, each court prefers the equilibrium
in which it is the hawk (thereby accruing the full value of the jurisdictional
resource) and the other court acts as the dove. The environment thus is
14The Hawk-Dove Game is also known as the Game of Chicken, and less famously as
the Snowdrift Game.
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one in which both courts have an incentive to pursue a policy of judicial
brinkmanship. Each court would like to intimidate the other into playing
restraint so that it can safely play assertive and reap the full jurisdictional
gain. Given that the two courts have the same incentive, though, choosing
the assertive strategy runs the risk of triggering a constitutional crisis–the
worst possible outcome for the two players.
To limit the chance that they wind up in an equilibrium in which they
have to acquiesce to the other court’s assertiveness while reducing the prob-
ability that the dispute escalates into a full-scale constitutional crisis, the
two courts may want to randomize among the pure strategies. In particular,
each may want to play the assertive strategy not with probability p = 1 but
with a probability sufficiently high to discourage the other court from opting
for a pure assertive strategy. A pair of mixed strategy profiles constitutes
a Nash equilibrium if each player associates the same expected utility with
each of his pure strategies. In other words, in a mixed strategy Nash equi-
librium, the players randomize so as to balance out the risks and benefits
associated with each pure strategy. The probability assigned to a particular
strategy must thus reflect the relative value of the associated payoffs. One
implication for our Hawk-Dove setup is that when the net cost arising from
a constitutional crisis is not much greater than the jurisdictional loss asso-
ciated with acquiescence, the courts will want to play the assertive strategy
with a higher probability. But when this cost is much larger than the loss
attached to acquiescence the courts will play the assertive strategy with a
much lower probability. A corollary is that, as shown in Figure 2, the prob-
ability of a jurisdictional dispute actually escalating into a constitutional
crisis decreases sharply, to approach zero, as the cost associated with such
an event goes up.15 For large crisis costs, we are more likely to observe the
courts peacefully sharing the jurisdictional resource than an escalation into
an all-out judicial war.
Figure 2 about here
Legal scholars have noted the parallel between Cold War international
relations and the ECJ’s relationship with the GFCC. Weiler and Haltern
(1996, 446-7), for example, argue that the GFCC has power to inflict massive
damage on the European Court, but the sheer scale of the repercussions
15The analysis here is predicated on the interpretation of mixed-strategy equilibria as
equilibria in actions. An alternative, and arguably more realistic, interpretation is to see
mixed-strategy equilibria as equilibria in beliefs (Aumann and Brandenburger, 1995).
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it would have for the EU, for Germany, and for the German Court itself,
makes an escalated judicial conflict between the two institutions an unlikely
prospect. Their analysis suggests that what holds together the EU legal order
is something akin to the Cold War doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction
(famously acronymed as MAD). The Cold War analogy, in turn, suggests
a neat way of re-interpreting the notion of constitutional pluralism–central
to EU law scholarship–in terms that are more explicitly empirical. As with
MAD, constitutional pluralism thus characterizes a particular equilibrium
where courts must be attentive to each other’s interests, lest they face a
mutually baneful crisis.
4 Extensions: Iteration, Communication and
Incomplete Information
The parsimonious model expounded above helps cast light on some of the
mechanisms that modulate relations between domestic and international ad-
judicators. The literature on international courts emphasises the impor-
tance of institutional design–notably formal access rules–as key determinant
of their influence (Keohane et al., 2000). Yet design can only account for a
fraction of the observed variation. And so, one merit of the baseline model is
to help elucidate why institutional design does not always predict effective-
ness. It has been argued that many international judicial bodies modelled
after the ECJ “resemble more closely in practice the ECJ during the 1950s
and 1960s than the ECJ today” (Alter, 2012, 151). Regarding the ECJ,
a related merit of the model is to show how the EU is (and has become)
unique, rather than assumes its uniqueness or sui generis character. Still,
there are important elements of the dynamic nature of judicial interactions
in advanced regimes like the European Union that the model fails to cap-
ture. First, judicial superpowers like the ECJ and the GFCC do not interact
in simultaneous, one-off manner but in sequential, repeated fashion. When
played sequentially instead of simultaneously, the Hawk-Dove Game confers
a clear advantage on the first mover. If, for example, the International Court
moves first and chooses to be assertive, the Domestic Court must then choose
between a jurisdictional loss and a constitutional crisis. Since acquiescence is
the Domestic Court’s best response in this situation, the model, thus mod-
ified, would predict that activist international judges will always have the
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upper-hand, at least as long as they move first. The unpalatable prospect
of facing such a dilemma can spur real-world players to look for ways to
lower the cost of a confrontation so as to escape the implacable logic of the
sequential Hawk-Dove game. So, in the same manner that this realization
spurred the Kennedy administration to abandon massive retaliation in favour
of flexible response as US defence strategy, a domestic court like the GFCC
may want to lower the costs associated with a constitutional crisis, both
for itself and the ECJ. A suggestion in that sense was made by the Court’s
former President, Roman Herzog, in a feature article that appeared in the
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung in September 2008. Herzog urged the GFCC
“to stop the ECJ” and to punish it for its recent bout of activism. Herzog
suggested that German constitutional judges declare the ECJ ruling in the
Mangold case ultra vires. As Herzog pointed out, the holding in Mangold
was, by the time, already moot, superseded as it had been by the entry into
force of a new directive. Therefore, the GFCC would not put the authority of
EU law immediately at risk by pronouncing it a ultra vires act. The reason-
ing was explicitly that Mangold provided the GFCC with a less destructive
means to show resolve (Herzog, 2008).
Repetition, however, can neutralize this first-mover advantage. By en-
abling human agents to punish or reward past behaviour, repetition and the
prospect of continued interplay fundamentally change the nature of social
interactions. In particular, the prospect of punishment (or reward) in subse-
quent encounters may suffice to give the agents an incentive to cooperate in
the present (Ku¨mmerli et al., 2007, Axelrod, 1984). Judges in the EU, too,
have memory of past interactions and are aware that they may interact again
in the future. As inter-court interactions take place against such indefinite
horizon, equilibria that would not be sustainable in a one-shot game may
thus become viable.
Another characteristic of advanced international regimes like the EU is
that they involve regular communication between international and domes-
tic judges. Much of what legal scholars call “judicial dialogue” occurs in
the form of obiter dicta, whereby courts signal their position on a particu-
lar issue without making any concrete, final determination (Arnull, 2012).
National courts in the EU have often used such dicta to convey threats to
disapply EU law should EU institutions overstep their mandate or breach
some constitutional red line. Moreover, these threats are issued in a context
of incomplete information. Just as ECJ judges are unlikely to have perfect
information about the preferences of domestic judges, so too are domestic
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judges likely to possess complete knowledge of the policy preferences of ECJ
judges. Incomplete information, in turn, creates an incentive for judges to
appear more hawkish than they really are in the hope of persuading the court
on the other side of the dispute to yield to their demands. This directly re-
lates to the doubts raised by legal scholars as to the effectiveness of domestic
non-compliance threats when these are never carried to execution (Weiler,
2009, Schmid, 2001).
The model I set out in the present Section incorporates these extensions.
Figure 3 illustrates the stage game. The game starts with the International
Court expanding the remit of the international regime. The Domestic Court
must then decide whether to respond by issuing a non-compliance threat (T )
or not (∼T ). The next move is for the International Court to choose whether
to maintain (M) or to reverse (∼M) its initial activist stance.16 If it chooses
∼M , the Domestic Court wins the jurisdictional dispute and reasserts its
authority. But in case the International Court holds firm to its expansionary
jurisprudence, the last move rests with the Domestic Court, which chooses
whether to respond by disapplying the International Court ruling (D) or not
(∼D).17 If, playing ∼D, the Domestic Court acquiesces, then the Domestic
Court loses the jurisdictional dispute and the International Court accrues
the full value it attaches to the jurisdictional resource. Finally, when the
Domestic Court chooses to defy the International Court by playing D, a
constitutional crisis ensues.18 Whenever the end of a branch of the game
16This sequence is consonant with accounts of the decision making practices of activist
international courts by legal scholars. Trevor Hartley, for example, observed that the ECJ
frequently follows a test the waters tactic to develop its case law:
A common tactic is to introduce a doctrine gradually: in the first case that
comes before it, the Court will establish the doctrine as a general principle
but suggest that it is subject to various qualifications; the Court may even
find some reason why it should not be applied to the particular facts of the
case. The principle, however, is now established. If there are not too many
protests, it will be re-affirmed in later cases; the qualifications then can be
whittled away and the full extent of the doctrine revealed (Hartley, 1988,
78-9).
17Note, though, that the act disapplied does not have to be a judgement issued by
the International Court but may be another rule emanating from the same international
regime (e.g. a decision enacted by the European Central Bank or the Commission in the
case of the EU).
18For illustrations of what these moves may concretely amount to I refer to the examples
provided in the introduction and the discussion in Section 5.
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tree is reached, the courts accrue the corresponding payoffs and the game
repeats. The model consists of the infinite repetition of this stage game.
Figure 3 about here
As before, the courts care about both jurisdictional authority and po-
tential crisis costs (when the Domestic Court decides to defy the activist
International Court), but with one major difference. A court may be of two
types: type ∈ {hawk, dove}. The hawk type associates jurisdictional ex-
pansion or reassertion with a higher gain (Jh for the Domestic Court and
αh for the International Court) but also acquiescence with a higher loss (re-
spectively −Jh and −αh). The doveish type, on the other hand, associates
assertiveness with a smaller gain (respectively J l and αl) but also acqui-
escence with a smaller loss (−J l, with −Jh < −J l < 0 for the Domestic
Court, and −αl, with −αh < −αl < 0 for the International Court). Types
are not permanent but redrawn probabilistically at the beginning of each
period. The International Court is of hawkish type with probability p and
doveish with probability (1 − p), while the Domestic Court is hawkish with
probability q and doveish with probability (1 − q). Variations in type can
be interpreted as reflecting variations in the intensity of judicial preferences
across policy areas or as resulting from changes in judicial personnel. Types
remain private knowledge for the duration of the stage game. Each court
knows its own type but knows only the prior probability of the other court’s
type being one type or the other. At the end of every period, however, types
are disclosed and each court can observe whether the other court was of
hawkish or doveish type.19 Future payoffs are discounted by discount factor
δ (0 < δ < 1). Similar to Sartori (2002), I model communication by the
Domestic Court as cheap talk. That is, threatening is a costless signal that
does not directly affects the payoffs.20 This permits us to investigate the
conditions under which a domestic high court judges possess incentives to
communicate their true preferences.
In the next two sections I discuss possible equilibria derived from this
model.
19This, of course, is a simplification. After an interaction, real-world courts will usually
learn something, but not everything about each others’ true preferences.
20As the real-world cost associated with writing obiter dicta is close to zero, it is more
realistic to model it as cheap talk. In the international relations literature communication
is usually treated as costly signal (Fearon, 1994, Putnam, 1988). However, it has been
demonstrated that communication can be consequential, as part of a reputation-building
strategy, even when modelled as cheap talk (Sartori, 2002).
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5 Interplay Between International and Do-
mestic Judicial Superpowers in Advanced
Regimes: Coexistence Equilibrium
As is the case for any infinitely repeated game, there are many concep-
tually possible equilibria in our model. Yet not all conceptually possible
equilibria are empirically plausible. Using Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
as solution concept, I derive the following Pacific Coexistence Equilibrium:
Equilibrium Path: On the equilibrium path, when 0 < p < 1 and 0 < q <
1, the two courts basically accommodate each other’s existence by trading
issues in a mutually beneficial way as the Domestic Court effectively uses
non-compliance threats to signal its true type. When the two courts are of
distinct types, the court that cares more about the issue, i.e. the hawkish
type, gets its way, receiving the high jurisdictional gain, while the other court,
the doveish type, acquiesces, thereby incurring the small loss jurisdictional
loss (−J l for the acquiescing Domestic Court, and −αl for the acquiescing
International Court). Meanwhile, when the courts are of the same type, each
court alternatively gets its way. More systematically:
Strategy for International Court :
a. If type = dove. In period t = 1, it plays M if Domestic Court plays
∼T ; it plays ∼M otherwise. In period t > 1, it plays ∼M if Domestic
Court plays T , or if Domestic Court plays ∼T and the last time the
two courts were of doveish type the International Court played M . If
last time the two courts were of doveish type the International Court
played ∼M , it plays M .
b. If type = hawk. In period t = 1, it always plays M . In period t > 1, it
plays M if ∼T , or if the last time the two courts were of hawkish type
International Court played ∼M ; otherwise it plays ∼M .
Strategy for Domestic Court :
a. If type = dove. In period t = 1, it plays ∼T and if International Court
plays M it plays ∼D. If period t > 1, it plays ∼T and ∼D when
International Court plays M .
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b. If type = hawk. In period t = 1, it plays T and plays ∼M if Interna-
tional Court plays M . If period t > 1, it plays T and plays ∼D when
International Court plays M .
On the equilibrium path of play, constitutional crises, outcomes 3 and 4 in
Figure 3, never occur; and only outcomes 1,2,4 and 5 are observed. Because
it is common knowledge that the Domestic Court expects to profit from issue-
trading, the Domestic Court has an incentive to signal its true type and the
International Court to believe it. Upon receiving the Domestic Court’s sig-
nal, the International Court updates its prior belief q about the Domestic
Court’s being of type= hawk.21 So, if we denote the International Court’s
posterior belief about the Domestic Court being of type= hawk as qˆ, then,
after observing the signal T , qˆ = 1. In short, as both courts expect to benefit
from trading issues, judicial dialogue effectively functions as a mechanism to
disclose judicial preferences and facilitate cooperation.
Punishment Path: When a court is caught deviating from the equilibrium
path this triggers punishment by the other court in all subsequent periods:22
a. If the court caught deviating is International Court, International Court
always plays ∼M while Domestic Court always plays T , and plays D
in case International Court plays M .
b. If the court caught deviating is Domestic Court, International Court
always plays M , whereas Domestic Court plays T with probability q,
∼T with probability (1− q) and responds to M by choosing ∼D.
Punishment means the punished court always acquiesces, suffering jurisdic-
tional loss, large or small, depending on its type. The punishing court,
meanwhile, accrues the jurisdictional gain associated with jurisdictional ex-
pansion or reassertion corresponding to its type. When the court caught
deviating is the Domestic Court because it has lied about its type–by issuing
a non-compliance threat despite low-intensity preference (J l) for the issue
at stake–shift to the punishment path means judicial dialogue breaks down.
The International Court no longer heeds to the Domestic Court’s message.
21It does so according to Bayes’ Rule.
22The equilibrium can also be shown to exist, albeit for a smaller range of parameter
values, when allowing for forgiveness after a certain number of periods. The Grim Trigger
variant I use here is for ease of exposition.
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The threat issued by the Domestic Court, therefore, has no impact, direct or
indirect, on the outcome of the game.
Equilibrium Conditions: Proof of the equilibrium is provided in the Ap-
pendix. Here I only briefly consider the conditions that must obtain in order
for the equilibrium to be sustainable. Generally speaking, the equilibrium
presupposes that the two courts do benefit from trading issues. This requires
that both courts prefer a single-period jurisdictional loss over a constitutional
crisis.23 Another condition is that types are not completely asymmetric in
their probability, which rules out simultaneously having p = 1 and q = 0 or
p = 0 and q = 1.24 Plotted in Figure 4 are the values of p and q for which the
equilibrium exists when holding the other parameters constant at plausible
values.
Figure 4 about here
A further condition is that the two courts care at least a middling amount
about the future. This requires that the expected payoff from cooperating
now and in the future (the continuation value of the equilibrium path) is
greater than the expected payoff from defecting now and facing the conse-
quences in the future (the continuation value of the punishment path for the
defecting court). For the Domestic Court, the strongest temptation to de-
fect is when it is doveish and must decide whether to issue a non-compliance
threat. Since the hawkish type gets its way when the other court is type =
dove, or when the other court is type = hawk but got its way last time the
courts were both hawkish, the Domestic Court may be tempted to lie and
issue a threat, so as to receive payoff J l instead of incurring loss −J l. The
doveish Domestic Court, though, must weigh this and future losses associ-
ated with a reputation for bluff, on the one side, against the cost of sticking




J l − C
2
for the Domestic Court, and
−αl > −αh > α− β
2
for the International Court.
24Provided other equilibrium conditions are met, when p = 1 and q = 0, the equilibrium
breaks down as the Domestic Court becomes indifferent between cooperation and devia-
tion. The opposite asymmetry, p = 0 and q = 1, results in what amounts to a Domestic
Supremacy Equilibrium. (The Domestic Court can, under this hypothesis, effectively use
its signal to impose permanent acquiescence on an International Court otherwise indif-
ferent between cooperation and defection.) These scenarios seem empirically implausible,
however. In practice, judicial preferences on the same court are likely to vary in intensity
across policy areas.
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to the equilibrium in the present in the expectation that it will be able to
reap the dividends of a reputation for honesty in the future, on the other.
Punishment by the Domestic Court when the International Court is
caught deviating is subject to another important incentive compatibility con-
straint. This is because domestic punishment cannot be credible unless the
Domestic Court is willing to trigger a constitutional crisis when the defecting
International Court persists in its activist stance. Were the Domestic Court
unwilling to make this move, then the whole equilibrium would unravel. As
a result, the International would not only accrue the full value of the ju-
risdictional good in the current period, but it would also conclude that it
is safe always to play M in the future. So in order to maintain domestic
judicial deterrence, the Domestic Court must be ready to play D, whenever
the International Court has been caught deviating in the previous period
or in the current period (when playing M out of turn after observing the
domestic signal T ). The credibility of domestic judicial deterrence requires
that the expected payoff from enforcing punishment in the future, minus the
cost of a constitutional crisis in the present, outweighs the payoff of domes-
tic acquiescence now and in the future. Figure 5 illustrates how changes in
the parameters of interest affect the credibility of domestic deterrence when
other parameters are held constant. Panel A shows how the Domestic Court’s
willingness to disapply an EU act relates to the cost associated with a con-
stitutional crisis and the rate at which it discounts future payoffs. Ceteris
paribus, effective deterrence requires that for crisis costs of larger magnitude
the Domestic Court care more about the future. Panel B plots the Domestic
Court’s high jurisdictional gain against the probability that it will be of type
= hawk in the future. Willingness to trigger punishment depends on high
probability the Domestic Court will be of type = hawk in the future and/or
that its hawkish type associates a jurisdictional gain with a higher reward.
Panel C shows how the probability of being hawkish relates to crisis cost.
Figure 5 about here
Consistent with this analysis, experiments have shown that iterated games
attaching large costs to simultaneous defection, such as the Iterated Hawk-
Dove Game, result in high levels of human cooperation (Ku¨mmerli et al.,
2007). More specifically, though, the equilibrium provides a plausible ac-
count of how the GFCC’s relationship with the ECJ has evolved over time.
As discussed above, both courts seem to be aware of the baneful repercus-
sions that a constitutional crisis would bring about. The two courts also
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know that mutual accommodation represents a better alternative.25 It is
also thought that “judicial dialogue” is the channel through which the two
courts have achieved such mutual accommodation (Stone Sweet, 2004, Ar-
null, 2012). Many scholars believe that the threat issued by the GFCC in its
Solange decision spurred the ECJ to subject EU legislation to more system-
atic human rights review (Stone Sweet, 2004, Weiler and Haltern, 1996, 460).
In similar fashion, its Maastricht ruling, by asserting that ultra vires EU acts
would be inapplicable in Germany, is thought to have put pressure on the
ECJ to exercise more restraint in the 1990s (Dehousse, 1998).26 What legal
scholars find more disconcerting is that the GFCC has alternated threats
with integration-friendly rulings. For that reason, some dismiss the case law
of the German Court as incoherent (Stein, 2011, Schmid, 2001). Viewed from
the perspective of our issue-trading equilibrium, however, the observed oscil-
lation in the domestic signal makes sense. Non-compliance threats and more
friendly dicta are the means through which the German Court communicates
the level of importance it attaches to the issue at hand. Another claim on
which the model casts doubt is that a court like the GFCC need to carry its
threats to execution in order for them to be effective. Because the GFCC
has never disapplied an EU act, some legal scholars dismiss it as a “dog that
barks but never bites” (Weiler, 2009, Schmid, 2001). Yet the model suggests
that, as long as the threat of defiance remains credible, the German Court
can contain the expansion of EU law without precipitating a constitutional
crisis.
25While parallels with Cold War relations have been made in scholarly writings (Weiler
and Haltern, 1996), a prominent GFCC judge, Udo di Fabio, has explicitly used the
expression “pacific coexistence” (friedliche Koexistenz in German) to characterise the sort
of relationship the German Court wants to establish with the European Court (see Fabio,
2010).
26Another illustration of successful containment by domestic judges is offered by the UK
Supreme Court in its dispute with the European Court of Human Rights over the status
of hearsay evidence in criminal proceedings. In its first chamber judgement, Al-Khawaja
and Tahery v United Kingdom, the Strasbourg Court held that criminal conviction could
not be solely or decisively based on hearsay evidence. In R v Horncastle, however, the
UK Supreme Court explicitly declined to follow this holding. The Grand Chamber of the
European Court of Human Rights, though, averted further escalation by overruling the
chamber decision, yielding in effect to the position of the British Court. (I am thankful
to an anonymous reviewer for pointing me this example.)
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6 Weaker Domestic Courts and the Limits
of Doctrinal Borrowing: International Law
Expansion Equilibrium
The analysis in the previous section demonstrates that a powerful domestic
court able to inflict severe institutional damage on the international regime
and its adjudicators can influence the regime’s development and pace of inte-
gration, all without triggering a constitutional crisis. But what about weaker
national courts in similarly advanced regimes?
As mentioned in the introduction, several domestic courts in the EU have
tried to import the German ultra vires doctrine. But, as our discussion of
the baseline game demonstrated, the problem for weaker domestic courts is
one of power asymmetry. They may well try to mimic the doctrinal signal
of stronger judicial actors, but unable to back their threats with credible de-
terrence, they find themselves unable to extract significant concessions from
international judges. The following Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium captures
the situation where the Domestic Court prefers acquiescence to a constitu-
tional crisis while the opposite holds for the International Court:
Strategy for International Court: always plays M .
Strategy for Domestic Court: If type = hawk, plays T ; if type = dove
plays ∼T . Always plays ∼D.
In this international law expansion equilibrium, the Domestic Court fails to
contain the International Court’s activism. In equilibrium, only outcome 2
and 5 in Figure 3 are observed. Because the International Court knows that
the Domestic Court will harm itself by following up on its threat, it ignores
the domestic signal. Judicial dialogue thus has no bite. As far as the EU
legal order is concerned, this implies that national courts lacking superpower
status are unlikely to reinforce their bargaining position vis-a`-vis the ECJ by
borrowing the German ultra vires doctrine.27 Faced with a non-compliance
threat from a weak domestic court, the ECJ may be willing to make marginal
concessions but not to compromise the core content of its doctrines.
27A weak domestic court, however, may use defiant language as a means to signal to a
strong national court in the hope of encouraging to join the cause. Exploring the conditions
under which this sort of horizontal dialogue can actually be consequential may be an
interesting avenue for future research on inter-court dynamics in heterarchical systems.
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The behaviour of some domestic high courts suggest they have realised
that they cannot emulate the GFCC but that, since they cannot beat the
European judges, they might as well join them. Constitutional courts in
Belgium, Italy, Spain and France once resisted the idea of legal integration
and refused to pass on cases to the ECJ. In the meantime, though, these
courts have shed the rhetoric of defiance and are now making active use of
the preliminary ruling mechanism (Dyevre, 2013).
Even as a (one-off) departure from the long-term equilibrium outcome,
the Czech case discussed above provides an instructive illustration of the
institutional limits of doctrinal borrowing. The Czech Constitutional Court
was an early adopter of the German doctrine. But its invocation did not
suffice to deter the ECJ. Nor did the Czech constitutional judges inflict much
harm on the ECJ when they followed through on their threat. As alluded to
above, domestic factors may have played the decisive part in the Czech case.
But, from the standpoint of EU law, the Czech ultra vires decision is unlikely
to inspire constitutional judges in other member states (Bobek, 2014).
7 Conclusion: The Conditions for Judicial
Defiance in Non-Hierarchical Court Sys-
tems
I have tried to identify the conditions under which domestic high courts will
resist the authority of international legal regimes. I have shown that, beyond
the desire of judges to expand or, at least to maintain, their jurisdiction,
differences in the costs courts associate with non-compliance can account for
varying patterns of inter-court interaction. Domestic courts are most likely to
defy international adjudicators when domestic non-compliance costs are low.
Yet the model predicts that low domestic non-compliance will not systemat-
ically result in judicial defiance being actually observed, as weaker interna-
tional judges have an incentive to exert restraint in anticipation of defiance.
In that sense the analysis shows that the relationship between regime strength
and observed domestic judicial defiance is not monotonic. One is more likely
to observe overt defiance at intermediate levels of integration (contentious
equilibrium) than at either low (ineffectiveness equilibrium) or high levels
(supremacy equilibrium). As for the most integrated legal regimes like the
EU, the model demonstrates that defiance makes domestic courts worse off,
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while the magnitude of the costs associated with a compliance crisis gives
powerful judicial bodies, such as the ECJ and the GFCC, strong incentives
to seek mutual accommodation through judicial dialogue. Contrary to schol-
ars who dismiss non-compliance threats as cheap talk, I have argued that
such threats can be effective, even if never actually carried to execution,
as long as they are backed by credible domestic deterrence. Disparities in
institutional stature and deterrence capacity then explain variations in the
ability of domestic courts to extract concessions from international judges
by means of dialogue. The model has many interesting implications for em-
pirical research on the dynamics of domestic judicial compliance. I highlight
three:
1. Beside documenting the dominant norm and ideology of the judiciary,
researchers who aim to explain variations in the reception of interna-
tional legal regimes by domestic courts should also investigate the atti-
tudes of legislators and other governmental actors towards international
law, as these determine the magnitude of domestic non-compliance
costs. Scholars may want to explore, for example, how the rise of
Europsceptic parties might affect commitment to EU membership and,
thereby, the position of national courts; or how the revival of populism
might bear on judicial support for the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights in Latin America.
2. To the extent that empirical measures of judicial independence equate
it with insulation from domestic politics, the model may explain the
puzzling fact that countries with more independent judicial institu-
tions often exhibit a worse compliance record with international law
(Huneeus, 2013, Staton and Moore, 2011). More independent judges
can afford to be less attentive to legislative preferences for international
law.
3. Frequent non-compliance threats are compatible with a high degree of
integration and embeddedness. While their heightened frequency may
lead to a slow down in the pace of legal integration, it may not necessar-
ily put an end to the regime’s expansion. Nor is more vigorous judicial
dialogue necessarily a symptom of imminent compliance breakdown.
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Appendix
A Proof of Coexistence Equilibrium
Proof is based on the one-stage deviation principle for infinite-horizon games
(Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991, 110). It demonstrates that no player can gain
by unilaterally deviating from the actions prescribed by the coexistence equi-
librium in any single period t, for all relevant histories h.
1. Beginning with the Domestic Court at the last node of the stage game
after the International Court played M , it is easy to see that, to the extent
that no court has been caught deviating (denote this history as h1), the Do-
mestic Court does not gain by playing D rather than ∼D. As long as no
history of deviation exists (history = h1), playing D does not only precip-
itate a constitutional crisis but because it itself constitutes deviation from
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the equilibrium path it triggers punishment from the International Court in
subsequent periods. For the Domestic Court, the present value of compliance
in this situation is at a minimum:






qpJh + q(1− p)Jh
− (1− q)pJ l + 1
2
(1− q)(1− p)J l − 1
2
(1− q)(1− p)J l) (1)
This simplifies to:
PVdomestic(compliance|h1) = −Jh + δ
1− δ (q(1− p)J
h − (1− q)pJ l) (2)







h − (1− q)J l) (3)
Therefore, as long as PVdomestic(compliance|h1) > PVdomestic(defection|h1)
the Domestic Court is better off playing ∼D. On the other hand, if the
International Court has been caught deviating either in the current period
(by playing M out of turn) or at the end of any previous period (denote this
history as h2), the Domestic Court must punish the International Court as
is prescribed by the Coexistence Equilibrium. In that case, the present value







h + (1− q)J l) (4)
whereas the Domestic Court’s unwillingness to punish entails that the present
value of defection is at best:
PVdomestic(defection|h2) = −J l +
1− δ (−qJ
h − (1− q)J l) (5)
(unwillingness to punish means playing M is always safe for the International
Court). The incentive compatibility constraint, therefore, is:





h + (1− q)J l) > −J l + δ
1− δ (−qJ
h − (1− q)J l) (6)
2. We now consider the International Court at the penultimate node of the
stage game. It is easy to see that, given history = h1, the International Court
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has no incentive to defect when it is of type = hawk and the Domestic Court
signals ∼T ; the same applies when the Domestic Court was caught deviating
in a previous period; ditto, for h1, when the International Court is of type =
dove, but the last time the courts were of type = dove the Domestic Court
had its way. Now, if there was no deviation in previous period but the last
time the two courts were of type = hawk the Domestic Court yielded (denote
this history as h1a), and the Domestic Court signalled T in the current period,
the present value of compliance (which involves playing ∼M in the current
period) for the hawkish International Court is captured by:
PVinternational(compliance|h1a, T ) = −αh+ δ
1− δ (p(1−q)α
h−(1−p)qαl) (7)
Because it involves making an immediate concession on an issue relatively
dearer to its judges, equation (7) is when the present value of compliance is
smallest for the International Court. By playing M out of turn, though, the
International Court immediately reveals deviation, which triggers undelayed
punishment by the Domestic Court:






h − (1− p)αl) (8)
(Immediate punishment means the International Court incurs the cost as-
sociated with a constitutional crisis in the present period while facing the
prospect of perpetual punishment in subsequent periods.) Therefore, the In-
ternational Court is most tempted to deviate from the equilibrium path when
it is type = dove, given one of the two following situations: the Domestic
Court played T in the current period (thus signalling hawkishness) and the
last time the two courts were of type = hawk the International Court yielded
(denote this history as h1b); the Domestic Court played ∼T in the current
period and the previous time both courts were of type = dove the Interna-
tional Court had its way (denote this history as h1c). The present value of
compliance for the International Court in both scenarios is thus captured by:
PVinternational(compliance|h1b, T ) = PVecj(compliance|h1c,∼T ) = −αl+
δ
1− δ (p(1− q)α
h − (1− p)qαl) (9)
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whereas the present value of defection is:
PVinternational(defection|h1b, T ) = PVecj(defection|h1c,∼T ) = αl+
δ
1− δ (p(1− q)α
h − (1− p)qαl) (10)
Therefore, the International Court is better off complying insofar as:
−αl + δ
1− δ (p(1− q)α
h− (1− p)qαl) > αl + δ
1− δ (−pα
h− (1− p)αl) (11)
3. Finally, we consider the Domestic Court at the communication stage.
The only situation in which defection can make the Domestic Court better
off is when it is type = dove and the previous time both courts were type
= hawk it yielded while the last time the courts were both type = dove the
International Court yielded (denote this history as h1d).
28 In that case, the
present value of compliance for the Domestic Court is captured by:
PVdomestic(compliance|h1d) = −J l + δ
1− δ (q(1− p)J
h − (1− q)pJ l) (12)
The present value of defection for the same circumstances is:
PVdomestic(defection|h1d) = J l + δ
1− δ (−qJ
h − (1− q)J l) (13)
This reflects the situation where the doveish Domestic Court plays T in
the current period, which in turn induces the International Court to infer
that its true type = hawk. As a result, the International Court plays ∼M
and the Domestic accrues payoff J l. However, at the end of the period, the
International Court observes the Domestic Court’s true type and punishment
ensues. So the Domestic Court is better of telling the truth as long as:
− J l + δ
1− δ (q(1− p)J
h− (1− q)pJ l) > J l + δ
1− δ (−qJ
h− (1− q)J l) (14)
28In other situations and inasmuch as there is no history of defection, signalling hawk-
ishness does not change the behaviour of the International Court in the current period.
Meanwhile, signalling becomes inconsequential after a court has been caught deviating.
36
B Proof of International Law Expansion Equi-
librium
Proof of the International Law Expansion Equilibrium is straightforward.
At the last node of the stage game, the Domestic Court cannot improve
its lot by revolting against the International Court, as this brings about
a constitutional crisis in the current period without stopping the Court of
Justice’s activism in subsequent periods. Regardless of history, the present
value of compliance for the Domestic Court is at a minimum:
PVdomestic(compliance) = −Jh + δ
1− δ (−qJ
h − (1− q)J l) (15)
Positing that the Domestic Court prefers a jurisdictional loss over a constitu-
tional crisis, this implicates that it is strictly better off complying. Knowing
this, the International Court has no reason to deviate from M at the preced-
ing node. The lack of credible domestic deterrence entails, in turn, that the
Domestic Court’s signal has no effect.
































Notes: J denotes the value of the jurisdictional resource at stake for the Domestic Court
and α the value attached by the International Court to the same jurisdictional resource.
C and β represent the cost arising from a constitutional crisis for, respectively, the
Domestic Court and the International Court.
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0 1 2 3 4
Relative Cost of Constitutional Crisis
Notes: The curve represents the probability that the courts are simultaneously assertive
resulting in a constitutional crisis as the cost associated with such an event rises. For
this example, we assume C = β. Value of jurisdictional resource is set at J = α = .1.
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Notes: For this simulation, we set C = β = 10, Jh = αh = 3,, J l = αl = 1, δ = 0.6.
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